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Crooks: Jacksonville Before Consolidation

Jacksonville Before Consolidation
by JAMES B. CROOKS

A

T the

inauguration of the new Jacksonville city-county consolidated government in October 1968, Local Government Study
Commission Chairman James Jacqueline Daniel wrote that “Jacksonville had experienced a political renaissance.” Ten years later,
Jacksonville mayor Hans Tanzler declared that consolidated government was “the salvation” of the city. In 1993, at the twenty-fifth
anniversary celebration of consolidated government, then-Mayor
Ed Austin called for rekindling “the spirit that drove the consolidation effort . . . because our form of government is the envy of cities
around the world.” Tanzler, chairing that celebratory occasion,
agreed, adding, “[c]onsolidation has been described as Jacksonville’s ‘Greatest Moment.’“1
For many Jacksonville residents, the consolidation of city and
county governments in 1968 climaxed a decade of changes in Jacksonville, but it was not the only show in town. The decade also saw
substantial urban growth and development, a full fledged civil
rights movement, attempts to turn around a school system in crisis,
and substantial political reform before consolidation took place. In
effect, consolidation became the capstone for a decade of urban
development and reform.
The starting point for change can be seen in the demographics. The city’s population declined slightly from 204,517 in 1950 to
201,030 in 1960 (and still further to approximately 196,000 in
1965), while Duval County grew rapidly from 304,029 to 455,411
during the same period. This county gain of almost fifty percent
was a continuation of a suburban population boom begun at the
end of World War II resulting from local economic growth and increased birth rates.2
James Crooks is professor of history at the University of North Florida. He
would like to thank Dr. Joan Carver, Alton Yates, and Gerry Wilson for their
careful reading of this manuscript.
1. Richard Martin, A Quiet Revolution: Jacksonville-Duval County Consolidation and the
Dynamics of Urban Reform (Jacksonville, 1993), xiv, 332-34.
2. Local Government Study Commission of Duval County, Blueprint for Improvement, 1966 (Jacksonville, 1966), 15-16.

Published by STARS, 1998

1

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 77 [1998], No. 2, Art. 3

142

F LORIDA H ISTORICAL QUARTERLY

Economic growth came in part from the substantial expansion
of the insurance industry following passage of the Regional Home
Office Law by the Florida legislature in 1956. The Prudential Insurance Company of America established its Southeast (later to become
South Central) regional home office in Jacksonville, and the State
Farm Group substantially expanded its facilities there. Other insurance companies establishing home offices in the city included Independent Life, Peninsula Life, American Heritage Life, Gulf Life,
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and the Afro-American Life Insurance
Company. By the end of the decade, Jacksonville claimed the title of
“Insurance Center of the Southeast” with seventeen locally headquartered insurance companies, five regional home offices, and
twenty major general insurance agencies. The expansion of banking
facilities, the arrival of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad home office
(forerunner of CSX Transportation) from Wilmington, North Carolina, and later the expansion of the United States naval presence
during the Vietnam War brought additional regional growth.3
Meanwhile downtown Jacksonville received a major facelift after World War II, much of it coming in the 1960s. Mayor W. Haydon Burns replaced the unused, rotting wharves along the
riverfront with concrete retaining walls, parking lots, walks, and
roadways. The construction of a new civic auditorium, city hall,
courthouse, jail, and coliseum became part of downtown’s urban
renewal. Private capital, in turn, funded construction of the Atlantic Coastline Building, a new downtown Sears Roebuck superstore,
Robert Meyer Hotel, Florida National Bank, Barnett Bank, and Independent Life Building. Across the St. Johns River on the south
bank, the new Prudential building, Baptist Hospital, Sheraton-Jacksonville Hotel, and Gulf Life Insurance Company were either completed or underway. To the east, the Jacksonville Port Authority
(created by the Florida legislature in 1963) began a major upgrading and expansion of its facilities. North of the Trout River, Burns’s
successor, Mayor Louis H. Ritter, began building the new Jacksonville International Airport.4
3. J. Edwin Larson, “Insurance Center of the Southeast,” Jacksonville Magazine,
Spring 1964, 19-23. Larson was the State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner.
4. Ron Sercombe, “Mr. and Mrs. Hogan Really Started Something When They
Built a Log Cabin,” Jacksonville Magazine, Summer 1963, 9-13; and Lawrence
Dennis, “JPA Finds Gold in its Silver Anniversary Year,” Jacksonville Magazine,
June/July 1988, 42-43.
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For residents of both city and county suburbs, downtown provided a variety of jobs for both high school and college graduates
working as clerks, secretaries, sales personnel, underwriters, credit
and claims personnel, managers, and professionals. Downtown
also provided department stores in which to shop and hotels, restaurants, and theaters for evenings on the town. It was clearly the
employment and entertainment center for the metropolitan area.
Yet changes beyond downtown also were underway. The Jacksonville Expressway System and new bridges across the St. Johns
River had begun to open southeastern portions of Duval County to
development. Suburban home-building crept eastward across Arlington and south to Lakewood and San Jose. Ira Koger’s Boulevard Center became one of the nation’s first suburban office parks.
In the sand dunes east of Arlington, Martin Stein began building a
major regional enclosed shopping center at Regency Square.
Across the St. Johns River, Gateway and Roosevelt Malls also
opened during these years, on the northside and westside, respectively. Increasingly suburban homeowners began to shift their
shopping patterns to the nearby malls at the expense of downtown
stores.5
Jacksonville’s development expanded beyond suburban and
commercial growth. In old Riverside, the Cummer Museum
opened in 1961, the result of a generous bequest by Mrs. Ninah
Holden Cummer, art collector and member of a prominent Jacksonville family. In the same neighborhood, board members of the
Jacksonville Children’s Museum sought to expand their collection
and programs beyond their crowded quarters. They combined a
$100,000 gift from the Junior League with a ninety-nine-year lease
from the city in a new park on the south bank of the St. Johns River
and the award-winning design of architect William Morgan to build
the core of the facility that now stands as the Museum of Science
and History. Next, trustees of the Jacksonville Art Museum began
plans to move the collection from its crowded Riverside location.
Land donated by the Koger family at the new Boulevard Center office park on the south side and designs provided by the architectural firm of ReynoIds, Smith and Hills led to the construction of a

5. Williams S. Johnson, “Spans and Ribbons of Progress,” Jacksonville Magazine, Fall
1963, 19, 27-31; “Boulevard Center,” Florida Trend, August 1962, 20-22; and Florida Times-Union, September 14, 1992.
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new facility, which opened in 1968. It later became the Jacksonville
Museum of Contemporary Art.6
During the same decade, the Duval legislative delegation in
Tallahassee secured authorization to establish a junior college and
later a state university in Jacksonville. In Washington, D.C., Congressman Charles Bennett obtained funding to build Fort Caroline
National Monument, a replica of the original European settlement
on the banks of the St. Johns River. For city boosters, Jacksonville
was on the move with downtown renewal, expanded transportation
facilities, suburban growth, and new or expanding cultural and educational institutions.7
A key player in what community leaders liked to call “Jacksonville’s Decade of Progress” was Mayor Haydon Burns. First elected
mayor in 1949 on a reform ticket challenging increased bus fares,
the thirty-seven-year-old Burns began a political career that resulted in five terms as mayor and a successful campaign to become
governor in January 1965. As mayor and one of five commissioners
serving as the city’s executive branch of government, Burns controlled the police and fire departments. A shrewd politician, he
built political alliances through patronage with the other commissioners and city employees. He campaigned for votes in the African
American community and appointed the first black police officers.
He won re-election by wide margins.8
But Burns was more than just a successful politician. He saw
himself as a city-builder determined to revitalize a decaying downtown. He secured passage of major bond issues to remove the dilapidated wharves along the St. Johns River. He built the new civic
auditorium, city hall, and coliseum. He lobbied for the new insurance law and recruited the Prudential and Atlantic Coast Line Railroad to Jacksonville.9

6. Cummer Gallery of Art (Jacksonville, n.d.); History, Jacksonville Art Museum (Jacksonville, September 1993, mimeograph); and Museum of Science and History of
Jacksonville, Inc. (Jacksonville, n.d., mimeograph).
7. Robert B. Gentry, ed., A College Tells Its Story: An Oral History of Florida Community
College at Jacksonville (Jacksonville, 1991), 1; Daniel L. Schafer, From Scratch Pads
and Dreams: A Ten Year History of the University of North Florida (Jacksonville, 1982),
v, 10-12; and “The Dedication of Fort Caroline National Memorial,” Papers: The
Jacksonville Historical Society, vol. 4 (Jacksonville, 1960), 57-62.
8. Gerry Wilson, interview with author, January 15, 1991, Jacksonville; Florida
Times-Union, November 23, 1987.
9. Florida Times-Union, November 23, 1987; former state senator Bill Beaufort,
interview with author, January 28, 1992, Jacksonville.
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Hayden Burns, mayor of Jacksonville, 1949-1965. Photograph courtesy of Eleanor
Watkins, Jacksonville.

Obviously Burns did not achieve his urban renewal efforts
alone. He had strong support from the business community. Yet it
was Burns as salesman for Jacksonville, with his slide show entitled
“The Jacksonville Story,” who left a legacy of downtown redevelopment during Jacksonville’s Decade of Progress. A grateful city
council honored Burns’s substantial contributions to Jacksonville
by naming the new city library after him in 1965.10
10. Not all Jacksonville residents felt positively about Burns. He came from a lowermiddle-class background that Jacksonville’s elite Ortega crowd frequently
snubbed. Raised on the north side, Burns graduated from Andrew Jackson
High School, attended Babson College near Boston, served in World War II as a
commissioned officer and naval aeronautics salvage specialist, and on the eve of
his election, worked in public relations. Burns worked hard at presenting himself as a business-oriented city official, but the lax financial management practices of the day convinced some observers that political patronage edged over
into corruption. One person who knew Burns well claimed this was untrue.
Another source asked how Burns, on a $15,000 mayoral salary, could own
homes in Jacksonville, Fort Lauderdale, and the North Carolina mountains.
One answer lay in the personal use of campaign funds left over after election
victories. Laws at that time did not regulate their use, as now. Beaufort, interview; and Jacksonville City Directory, 1949, vol. 47 (Richmond, Va., 1949), 99.
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Rutledge H. Pearson Sr., civil rights leader in Jacksonville. Photograph courtesy of
Mary Ann Pearson, Jacksonville.
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As white Jacksonvillians renewed their downtown and expanded into the suburbs, the forty-two percent of the population
that comprised black Jacksonville began its quest for integration
into the city’s mainstream. A month after the famous Greensboro,
North Carolina, sit-ins in January 1960, Jacksonville African Americans entered Woolworth’s, Penney’s, Grant’s, Kress, and other
downtown stores requesting service at lunch counters that previously had excluded them.
The leader of the sit-in movement was a remarkable thirty-oneyear-old high school social studies teacher named Rutledge H.
Pearson. A Jacksonville native, graduate of segregated Stanton
High School and Huston-Tillotson College in Austin, Texas, Pearson played professional baseball briefly before turning to teaching.
Tall, slim, and brown skinned, Pearson was advisor to the NAACP
Youth Council, many of whose members had been his students in
the Duval County public schools. The young people loved Pearson.
Several remembered him as the “Pied Piper of Integration,” a charismatic man who listened to and respected his young charges. He
enjoyed their youthful energy and humor, instilling in them the
principles of non-violence along with the ideals of freedom’s
rights.11
Under Pearson’s leadership, youthful demonstrators assembled and picketed on the sidewalks in front of stores that excluded
them. Others attempted to obtain service at lunch counters. Store
managers responded by closing the counters. Still the demonstrators persisted, daily after school and on the weekends, with a sense
of mission fondly remembered a generation later.12
Spring turned to summer and downtown merchants complained about losing business. Their Miami counterparts had already desegregated their lunch counters. Proposals to open lunch
counters in Jacksonville, however, required the support of Mayor
Burns. As police and fire commissioner, he could control potential
white rabble rousers. Reflecting the segregationist attitudes of the
majority of southern whites at that time, Burns refused. The demonstrations continued.13

11. Quillie L. Jones and Bob Ingram, interview with author, November 4, 1991;
Lloyd Pearson, interview with author, November 5, 1991; and Alton Yates, interview with author, September 25, 1991, all in Jacksonville.
12. Yates, interview.
13. Pittsburgh Courier, March 26, April 23, September 24, 1960.
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On Saturday, August 27, the NAACP Youth marched to Hemming Park. They sat-in at the Woolworth lunch counter and moved
next door to J.C. Penney’s. Then they proceeded to the Grant and
Kress department stores a block away before returning to the park.
At that point they were attacked by 150 axe-handle- and baseballbat-wielding whites. The demonstrators retreated to the nearby
black neighborhood of LaVilla. Jacksonville police at the scene did
nothing to protect the young people from the mob. In LaVilla, the
Boomerang gang, a group of street-wise young men not affiliated
with the Youth Council, heard of the attack and mobilized to confront the white mob. In response, two hundred police officers,
squad cars, and fire engines intervened, separating the antagonists
and restoring order. An uneasy calm settled over downtown, but on
neighboring streets, acts of random violence by both blacks and
whites continued into the night.14
Afterwards, black clergy from the Jacksonville Ministerial Alliance met with Mayor Burns and Duval County Sheriff Dale Carson.
Burns again refused to support desegregated lunch counters, rejected appeals to form a biracial committee to discuss grievances,
and urged all parties, black and white, to keep the peace. This response clearly was unsatisfactory to blacks and the demonstrations
continued. 15
Sit-ins and demonstrations were not the only weapons of
Jacksonville African Americans in 1960. Businessman Frank
Hampton went to court to desegregate the city’s recreational facilities. A year earlier he had tried to open the city’s municipal
golf courses to blacks. When federal courts ordered their integration, the city sold them to private parties at bargain prices. Hampton now sued to integrate all municipally owned segregated
facilities, including the Gator Bowl, new civic auditorium, baseball
stadium, and parks. In December 1960, the federal courts ruled in
Hampton’s favor. The city could not sell all of these facilities, especially with their bonded debt. Thus in January, “all over town,” reported the Pittsburgh Courier, “the ‘white’and ‘colored’signs . . .
were torn down and tossed into garbage receptacles.” Hampton

14. Jones, interview; Yates interview; Pearson, interview; Rodney Hurst, interview
with author, February 18, 1997, Jacksonville; Pittsburgh Courier, September 3 and
10, 1960; Jacksonville Journal, August 27, 1960; and Florida Times-Union, August
28, 1960.
15. Florida Times-Union, August 29, 1960; Pittsburgh Courier, September 10, 1960.
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and his supporters celebrated by taking their children to the Jacksonville Zoo and ordering soft drinks at the formerly “white” lunch
counters. 16
In December 1960, six years after the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, local NAACP attorney Earl Johnson filed suits on behalf of black parents and their
children for school desegregation. In court, school officials acknowledged that all eighty-nine white and twenty-four black schools
were completely segregated— students, teachers, and administrators. United States District Court Judge Bryan Simpson ordered the
Duval County School Board to develop a plan for integration. In
October 1962, he approved a board plan for neighborhood schools
integrating initially first and second grades, and one additional
grade each year thereafter. In residentially segregated Jacksonville,
the court decision did not look promising. When the next school
year began in September 1963, only thirteen black first graders
were enrolled in five previously all-white schools. According to the
Jacksonville correspondent of the Pittsburgh Courier, “a wave of
threatening phone calls to parents . . . succeeded in deterring the
integration of other schools.” Violence followed in February 1964,
when five Ku Klux Klansmen dynamited the home of one of the
first graders. Fortunately no one was hurt. Appeals to expedite the
process fell on deaf ears, and by the fall of 1964, only sixty-two black
youngsters had enrolled in previously all-white schools.17
Frustrated by both the school board and the court, NAACP
leaders supported by the Interdenominational Ministers Alliance,
and other groups in the black community turned to direct action,
challenging the system where it might hurt: the pocketbook. State
support for local schools was based on pupil attendance. Students
staying away from school would reduce that support. In a carefully
organized campaign beginning on Monday, December 7, 1964,
17,000 black youngsters skipped school. The next day 10,000 children stayed away, while 7,000 absented themselves on Wednesday,
The 34,000 absentees cost the county $75,000 but did not change
school board policies. A year later, still only 137 black students (less

16. Pittsburgh Courier, December 17, 1960, January 21, 1961.
17. Cormac O’Riordan, “School Desegregation in Duval County, 1960-1971,”
unpublished manuscript, 1990, 8-11, in author’s possession; Pittsburgh Courier,
January 13 and September 1, 1962, February 29, 1964; Florida Times-Union,
March 13 and August 29, 1964.

Published by STARS, 1998

9

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 77 [1998], No. 2, Art. 3

150

F LORIDA H ISTORICAL QUARTERLY

than one-half of one percent of the total black student population)
attended previously all-white schools. No whites attended all-black
schools.18
Meanwhile Pearson, by now president of both the local branch
and the state chapter of the NAACP, continued to press for community-wide desegregation. A proposed Easter 1963 boycott of
downtown stores was canceled when fifteen merchants agreed to
provide jobs for previously excluded African Americans. Only five,
however, followed through on their promises. That summer, the
NAACP picketed Southern Bell demanding jobs. When Southern
Bell officials claimed they wanted to hire blacks but could find no
qualified candidates, NAACP officials identified a dozen candidates, one of whom had worked successfully as a telephone operator for three years in New York. In September, theater owners
agreed to desegregate downtown but then reneged. Hotel proprietors agreed to accept blacks as guests only if they were members of
predominantly white convention delegations. Restaurant owners
promised service but also later backed down.19
Events escalated at the beginning of 1964. Youthful demonstrators supported by black clergy sought to desegregate downtown
restaurants. Management refused to serve them and called the police when the youths refused to leave. In mid-March, demonstrators moved through downtown and its fringes making their
presence felt by walking slowly in front of traffic, acting boisterously and calling attention to their demands. Arrests followed,
along with more demonstrations and more youths in jail. Pearson
assembled two hundred supporters in front of the police station to
protest the arrests. Observers feared an impending violent confrontation the weekend of March 20-21.20
These demonstrations occurred during a hard fought gubernatorial primary campaign in which Mayor Bums was a candidate.
One of his opponents had commented that race relations throughout Florida were generally good, except for Jacksonville. Burns became defensive and determined to end the protests. He swore in
496 firefighters as special police to assist his 508-member police de18. O’Riordan, “School Desegregation in Duval County,” 15; and Pittsburgh Courier,
December 19, 1964.
19. New York Times, March 26, 1964; Pittsburgh Courier, August 3, 1963.
20. Florida Times-Union, March 18 and 20, 1964, Jacksonville Journal, March 19 and
20, 1964; and Southern Regional Council, “Report L-47” (Atlanta, April 16,
1964, mimeograph), 1, 2.
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Civil rights demonstrators in Jacksonville led by Rutledge H. Pearson Sr. Photograph
courtesy of Mary Ann Pearson, Jacksonville.

Published by STARS, 1998

11

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 77 [1998], No. 2, Art. 3

152

F LORIDA H ISTORICAL QUARTERLY

partment in maintaining order. With one thousand law enforcement officers, Burns said in a pre-arranged television interview that
Saturday night, “peace will prevail.” In response to Burns’s call for
law and order, someone firebombed the mayor’s campaign headquarters in the black community. Though little damage was done,
Burns blamed his political foes.21
The following Monday, a crowd of NAACP youth acting independently of Pearson and the parent body assembled in Hemming
Park downtown. The mayor ordered his police to “disperse or arrest them.” With their motorcycle sirens screaming and their engines roaring, police dispersed the demonstrators who headed
north to the all-black New Stanton High School, where some 250
persons entered the building apparently to recruit more demonstrators. Within minutes seven squad cars arrived on the scene.
Someone pulled a fire alarm evacuating students and demonstrators alike. By this time hundreds of people were milling about outside the school. While school officials tried to regain control of
their students, other demonstrators moved on to Darnell Cookman Junior High School. It was neither an orderly procession, nor
was it quite a mob. Police followed, arresting youths who sassed
back or threw bottles or rocks. In other parts of the city, police
closed off ramps to the expressway entering downtown; firefighters
responded to real and false alarms in the black community; an unidentified white assailant shot and killed a black woman stooping
to pick up packages dropped in the street; other assailants shot at
three sailors, two of them black, when their car was stopped at a
barricade. Mayor Bums downplayed the seriousness of the events,
assuring television viewers that it was not a riot but more of an outburst similar to what might occur following a Florida-Georgia football game.22
The next day, Tuesday, March 23, demonstrations resumed
with a bomb hoax at New Stanton High School. Police arrived.
Someone threw a rock. A youth vandalizing a bread truck was arrested by a black police officer and placed in a patrol car. While
one group of students distracted the officer, others freed the ar-

21. Florida Times-Union, March 22 and 23, 1964.
22. Jacksonville Journal, March 23, 1964; Florida Times-Union, March 24, 1964; New
York Times, March 24, 1964; Bob Ingram, interview with author, September 4,
1997, and Quillie Jones, interview with author, September 5, 1997, both in Jacksonville.
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rested youth. The officer pulled his revolver and fired warning
shots into the air. Instead of quieting the crowd, the shots spurred
rumors that a student had been hit. Others responded, throwing
bricks and bottles. Police reinforcements arrived including fifteen
cars carrying state troopers. As tensions escalated, several teachers
persuaded the assistant police chief on the scene that they could restore order if he would withdraw his men. The officer wisely
agreed, and the students gradually returned to their classrooms,
but not before a handful of youths attacked a group of white journalists, overturned their car, and set it afire. Across the city, similar
though less violent scenes took place at other inner city schoo1s.23
Subsequently a privately selected biracial commission of business and professional men under the leadership of Judge William
H. Maness met, held public hearings, and proposed voluntary desegregation of all facilities serving the public along with increased
job opportunities for blacks. Its report got shelved. Little change
took place locally until after congressional passage of the Civil
Rights Act that summer, desegregating hotels, restaurants, theaters, and other facilities serving the public. Only then did white
Jacksonville begin to move.24
While African Americans pushed for desegregation, community leaders faced another crisis when all fifteen public high
schools were disaccredited by the Southern Association of Colleges
and Schools in 1965. Conditions were reprehensible. Teachers and
students were the primary victims. Duval County ranked last
among Florida’s sixty-seven counties in per pupil funding. In
teacher salaries, among Florida’s ten largest counties, Duval again
ranked last. Low salaries in turn contributed to an annual twentyfive percent teacher turnover rate. Too many teachers were either
unqualified or teaching out of field. Working conditions were comparably poor and included overcrowded classrooms, inadequate
instructional tools, no time during the day for preparation or grading, and unpaid overloads for extracurricular activities. In addition, one-quarter of the teachers (seventy-five percent of the male

23. Jacksonville Journal, March 24, 1964; Florida Times-Union, March 25, 1964; New
York Times, March 25, 1964; Pittsburgh Courier, April 4, 1964.
24. Florida-Times Union, March 26, 1964; and December 31, 1964; Jacksonville Journal,
March 26, 1964; and William H. Maness, interview with author. Januarv 25.
1992, Jacksonville.
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teachers) had to work second jobs to support themselves or their
families. 25
For Duval County students, large classes, outdated or inadequate numbers of textbooks, minimal laboratory, library, or audiovisual equipment, and mediocre instruction inevitably affected
their education. The average Duval County student did less well
than other Florida high school graduates on college placement exams. Their drop-out rate was higher. Only sixty percent of seventh
graders completed high school. In the elementary grades, large
numbers of students were overage for their grade. Classes for handicapped or gifted students barely existed, and kindergartens existed not at all.26
Conditions for African American youngsters were worse than
those for white students. Most of the overcrowding was in their segregated schools. Crumbling physical facilities, ragged hand-medown textbooks, and minimal laboratory or library materials are
still remembered by former pupils a generation later. Only the
most determined young people completed their studies and went
on to college, supported by dedicated teachers, coaches, and administrators.27
The Duval County public schools also suffered from critical deficiencies in the leadership and management. School policies were
affected by eight different elected boards with much conflict and
overlap. The popularly elected school superintendent (the only one
among the twenty largest school systems in the nation) had authority independent of the school board and was not answerable to it.28
Duval County was the only school system among the nation’s
largest without an administrative structure delineating areas of authority and responsibility. Decisions large and small were made at
the center of a system with 4,842 teachers and 106,370 students. No
assistant or area superintendents existed for delegated responsibilities. The superintendent even interviewed individual teaching ap25. “Summary of the Report of the School Bootstrap Committee, November 6,
1963,” 13-18, Florida Room, Haydon Burns Library, Jacksonville; and Duval
County, Florida Public Schools: A Survey Report (Nashville, 1965) (hereinafter Peabody Survey), 47-52, 55-56, 98-99, and chapter 7.
26. “Bootstrap Report,” 18-21; Peabody Survey, chapters 2, 4, and 5.
27. Citizens Committee for Better Education in Duval County, “Still Separate, Still
Unequal: A Study Specifically Related to Discrimination and Inequities in the
Duval County Public School System by the Citizens’ Committee for Better Education” (Jacksonville, May 1965, mimeograph).
28. “Bootstrap Report,” 24-31; Peabody Survey, chapter 5.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol77/iss2/3

14

Crooks: Jacksonville Before Consolidation

J ACKSONVILLE B EFORE C ONSOLIDATION

155

plicants, particularly if they were black. Principals were considered
political appointees, and ten years after Brown v. Board of Education,
Duval County still had a separate division of Negro education
staffed by all-black personnel.29
Of all the problems confronting the Duval County schools, the
greatest was financial. On a per pupil basis, Duval County spent
twenty to twenty-five percent less than the average of other Florida
counties or large systems nationwide. Yet Duval was not a poor
county. In the early sixties, it was third in the state in per capita personal income and in median family income. The tax rate was the
maximum twenty-five mills permitted under the state constitution.
The problem lay with property assessments. In 1964, the Duval
County Taxpayers Association reported that property was assessed
locally at only thirty percent of true value. On a $15,000 house (decent accommodations in the 1960s), a thirty percent assessment resulted in an assessed value of $4,500. With the Florida homestead
exemption then at $5,000 of assessed value, the homeowner paid
no taxes. The Taxpayers Association estimated that of 93,487
households in Duval County in 1963, two-thirds were totally exempt from all property taxes. A fifty percent assessment, less than
that of Dade, Pinellas, or Hillsborough Counties, would close
much of the funding gap for Duval County’s schoo1s.30
In 1962, the Jacksonville Chamber of Commerce initiated a citizens’Bootstrap Committee composed of representatives from the
business and professional community, League of Women Voters,
Junior League, Parent-Teacher Associations and trade unions. It issued its report in 1963, followed by a book-length study two years
later undertaken by consultants from the George Peabody College
of Teachers in Nashville. Meanwhile, African Americans, under the
sponsorship of the local branch of the NAACP, formed the Citizens
Committee for Better Education in Duval County and issued its report in 1965.
The 1964 county elections provided an opportunity to begin to
turn around the deterioration of the public schools. The incumbent property appraiser promised to hold the line on assessments.
His challenger promised to face the school financial crisis by raising them. The issues were widely discussed in the media, but the
voters gave the incumbent a decisive victory. Low taxes, regardless
29. Peabody Survey, 46-48, 286-89.
30. Ibid., 313-19; “Bootstrap Report,” 37-38.
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of the educational consequences, appeared to be the voters’
choice. 31
One week after the election, the Florida Department of Education stripped state accreditation from eight local schools and issued warnings to thirty-seven others. The Florida Commission of
the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) announced it would recommend disaccreditation of all fifteen high
schools (which took place in 1965). Belatedly, the Jacksonville community began to awaken. Newspaper editorials blamed local conditions on the “indifference, apathy and selfishness of Duval
residents.” Prominent citizens worried about disaccreditation’s effect upon college-bound students. Leading clergy pointed to the
moral responsibility of taxpayers to provide adequate education for
the next generation. High school students demonstrated downtown carrying signs demanding “No accreditation without taxation.” The Duval County Taxpayers Association under the
leadership of railroad executive Prime F. Osborne III filed suit
seeking a “just evaluation” of properties. In early 1965, local Circuit
Court Judge William Durden ordered full market value property
assessments by July 1, 1965. After three years of citizen efforts, conditions began to improve.32
The fourth area of substantial change before consolidation
took place at city hall. The turnaround began mid-decade. Floridians elected Haydon Bums governor in 1964, and he moved to Tallahassee the following January. Succeeding Burns as mayor of
Jacksonville was City Commissioner Louis H. Ritter, a thirteen-year
veteran at city hall. First elected to the city council in 1951 at the
age of twenty-six, Ritter played well the “old boy” game of insider
politics. But he was more than just a politician. A University of Florida graduate with a degree in public administration, Ritter worked
hard as mayor. He accepted the changes taking place locally and
nationally in the 1960s especially in the area of race relations. He
began talking directly with civil rights leaders and appointed the
first African Americans to city policy-making and advisory boards.
He also sought federal aid for urban renewal and welcomed Presi-

31. Peabody Survey, 9.
32. Ibid., 10-11; James R. Rinaman, interview with author, February 19, 1992, Jacksonville; and Walter A. Rosenbaum and Gladys M. Kammerer, Against Long
Odds: The Theory and Practice of Successful Government Consolidation (Beverly Hills,
Calif., 1974), 44.
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Louis H. Ritter, mayor of Jacksonville, 1965-1967. Photograph courtesy of Louis H.
Ritter, Jacksonville.

Published by STARS, 1998

17

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 77 [1998], No. 2, Art. 3

158

F LORIDA H ISTORICAL QUARTERLY

dent Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty with the formation of the
Greater Jacksonville Economic Opportunity Program. Unlike his
predecessor who spurned federal dollars for fear of federal controls (especially in the area of race relations), Ritter sought federal
help, securing for Jacksonville one of the first Model Cities Programs. Aware of the disgraceful condition of the sewage-ridden St.
Johns River and its tributaries, the mayor appointed an advisory
committee for water pollution control and applied for federal dollars to expand Jacksonville’s sewage treatment facilities. In addition, he secured a minimum standard housing code to upgrade
20,000 substandard houses and developed plans for expanded
parks, recreational facilities, additional public housing, improved
transportation, and a community college campus downtown.33 In
his race to be elected mayor in the spring of 1967, Ritter won a plurality in the three-person Democratic Party primary, but then lost
narrowly in the run-off to forty-year-old Hans Tanzler Jr., another
University of Florida graduate, former Southeastern Conference
basketball star, attorney, and criminal court judge. Under normal
circumstances, Ritter would have won re-election handily. But 1967
was different. Stormy weather on the north side of town deterred
from the polls many African American voters who supported Ritter.
Perhaps more important, Tanzler’s victory reflected strong opposition to what was perceived by many white voters to be corrupt and
partisan politics, which had surfaced over the preceding year in the
wake of grand jury investigations.
The grand jury investigations were the result of a series of television exposés that began in 1965 on WJXT, a local station owned
by the Washington Post-Newsweek Corporation. Its news and public
affairs director, Bill Grove, felt that other local media “were glossing over the essential problems of the metropolitan area . . . contenting themselves with superficial reports on their news pages.”
WJXT chose to investigate. It reported the purchases of luxury automobiles for city officials without competitive bids, excessive insurance costs, and lawsuits resulting from jurisdictional disputes
33. Department of Housing and Urban Development, News (HUD-No. RH-66-768),
December 13, 1966; “Confidential Memo to Mayor Ritter,” November 22, 1966;
Citizens Advisory Committee on Water Pollution Control, Report, Citizens Advisory Committee for Water Pollution Control (Jacksonville, November 17, 1966); Jacksonville-Duval Area Planning Board, Minutes, May 26, 1966; and Louis H. Ritter,
“Speech to Engineering Professional Club,” September 30, 1966. All documents
from Louis H. Ritter file, Mayor’s Papers, City Hall, Jacksonville.
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between the city council and city commission. In February 1966,
WJXT called for a grand jury investigation of political and governmental abuse.34
Criminal Court Judge Marion W. Gooding responded to the
call at the beginning of the court’s spring term. In forming a new
grand jury, he challenged the jurors to either prove or disprove the
allegations of WJXT. That summer and fall, the jury heard testimony from local officials. Periodically, it issued reports.35
The first report on June 30 condemned the city commission’s
practices of doling out insurance contracts to “friends and political
allies” without regard to “cost, coverage, need or sound business
practices.” The absence of competitive bids and the failure to consolidate similar coverages cost Jacksonville taxpayers hundreds of
thousands of dollars per year.36
The second presentment on July 22 indicted two council members and the head of the Recreation Department with grand larceny, conspiracy, and perjury. Thirteen indictments charged the
three men with purchasing televisions, watches, jewelry, and electric blankets from a sporting goods store and charging them to the
city recreation department.37
An August 12 report focused on the purchase of 168 automobiles over the preceding five years from one dealer without competitive bids. The city paid maximum list price for each car. City
commissioners relied on subordinates to make the purchases. Department heads signed off on the purchases but claimed the commissioners had authorized them. Purchasing agents and auditors
said they simply followed orders. No one seemed to be responsible.
Meanwhile city officials used their luxury sedans for private as well
as public transportation, charging the cost of fuel on city credit
cards. Copies of the charge slips secured from oil companies
lacked signatures yet the city paid the bills.38
Next, City Commissioner Dallas L. Thomas, a twelve-year veteran, after whom a riverfront park recently had been named, resigned over charges that the city had paid for labor and building
materials used on his private property. He submitted a check to the

34. Martin, A Quiet Revolution, 71-75. Grove is quoted on
35. Florida Times-Union, May 28, 1966.
36. Martin, A Quiet Revolution, 75-76; Florida Times-Union,
37. Martin, A Quiet Revolution, 77-78; Florida Times-Union,
38. Martin, A Quiet Revolution, 78-79; Florida Times-Union,
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city for $8,872.01 pleading ignorance of the whole affair. Subsequently, the grand jury indicted him on forty counts of larceny.39
Over the succeeding months, further indictments followed
against the city auditor, two city council members, and one city
commissioner. By the end of the six-month term in November, the
grand jury had indicted two of five city commissioners, four of nine
city council members, and two other ranking officials in city government. Not all of the indictments led to convictions, but the
grand jury’s report verified what many Jacksonville voters had long
believed: local government was corrupt. The corruption was not on
the grand scale of a Tammany Hall Boss like William Marcy Tweed,
who stole millions of dollars from the City of New York. Rather it
was the more common “nickel and dime” corruption seen in many
boss-ridden American cities where officeholders and contractors
used public funds for private perks (a television set here, home improvements there), and special interests kicked back a small portion of their profits in campaign contributions to re-elect their
friends to office. It was a practice that characterized many local governments that had become entrenched and ripe for reform.
Another factor in the reform thrust was the growing recognition of the high cost of Jacksonville’s city government. In addition
to the luxury sedans and excessive insurance costs was the ninetythree percent increase in the city budget over the preceding ten
years in the context of a declining population. The Local Government Study Commission in 1966 concluded that Jacksonville spent
substantially more on sanitation, police, fire protection, parks and
recreation, and other personal services than did other cities of
comparable size, without a lot to show for it.40
The reform thrust that elected Hans Tanzler mayor carried
over into city council elections where eight of nine incumbents lost
their seats. Most significant among the races were the victories of
two African American candidates, Mary Singleton and Sallye
Mathis.
Forty-year-old Singleton, a graduate of Florida A & M University, former school teacher, and business partner with her husband

39. Martin, A Quiet Revolution, 79; Florida Times-Union, August 24 and 31, 1966. Subsequently, Thomas pleaded no contest and received a prison sentence. Florida
Times-Union, November 8, 1967.
40. Local Government Study Commission, Blueprint for Improvement (Jacksonville,
1966), 82.
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in five barbecue restaurants, had entered politics supporting her
husband in losing council election campaigns in 1955 and 1963.
Following his death in 1964, she became active in the Duval County
Democratic Executive Committee, crossing racial lines and making
many white friends. She was bright, capable, and “a dynamic, loveable person,” according to Hans Tanzler. Mayor Ritter appointed
her to the Housing Board where she served as vice chair. Frank
Hampton helped persuade her to run for city council. Despite recent surgery for breast cancer, she agreed. She campaigned vigorously, winning support from white Catholics (she was a practicing
Roman Catholic), Jewish groups, and the 35,000-member (white)
Northeast Florida Building and Construction Trades Council. Singleton won decisively in the second primary with sixty percent of
the vote and faced no Republican opposition in the general election. The victory was particularly impressive because council candidates, while representing districts, were elected at large by all of the
city’s black and white voters.41
Where Mary Singleton came from a strong partisan Democratic background, fifty-five-year-old Sallye Mathis approached her
council campaign more as a civil rights activist with the NAACP and
as a nonpartisan community leader. A graduate of Bethune Cookman College, she too taught school. She also counselled students
and became dean of girls at Matthew V. Gilbert Junior-Senior High
School. She retired in 1962 following her husband’s death and began devoting herself full time to community issues. She helped develop strategy and marched for civil rights locally. She observed city
council meetings on behalf of the League of Women Voters. She integrated the governing board of the Jacksonville YWCA and helped
organize the Jacksonville Opportunities Industrial Council. She
worked with Wendell Holmes on school desegregation. Mayor Ritter asked her help in developing the city’s antipoverty program.
Like Mary Singleton, Sallye Mathis had crossed racial lines and had
substantial support in the white community, from organized labor
and others. Her NAACP colleagues urged her to run for the city
council. She defeated the race-baiting incumbent Barney Cobb in
both primaries and went on to win the general election.42
41. Barbara Hunter Walch, New Black Voices: The Growth and Contributions of Sallye
Mathis and Mary Singleton in Florida Government (Jacksonville, 1990), 34-51, 106
(Tanzler quotation); and Florida Times-Union, June 7, 1967.
42. Walch, New Black Voices, 56-73, 86-94, 107-17.
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The election of Tanzler, Singleton, and Mathis (as well as future mayor Jake M. Godbold who also defeated an incumbent),
provides evidence that Jacksonville voters had begun to clean up
what many considered to be a politically corrupt city before the
passage of the consolidation referendum. The election of Singleton and Mathis, however, suggests something more. White Jacksonville was beginning to accept integration. Racial attitudes were
moderating. Nancie Crabb, active with the League of Women Voters and later elected to city council, believed the civil rights
marches of the 1960s raised the consciousness of whites. They began to see blacks as part of the community. Lew Brantley from the
Duval legislative delegation and active with the Jacksonville Jaycees,
had come to believe that anyone aspiring to community leadership
in the late sixties must aggressively look “to include the whole community rather than exclude anybody. We knew,” he said, “we had to
work with the black community.” This shift in attitude was also reflected in Mayor-elect Tanzler’s declaration that “qualifications,
not color of skin [would be] his criterion for appointments to city
boards.“43
The city elections of May 1967 preceded the consolidation referendum by three months. It showed Jacksonville voters clearly involved with political and racial reforms. The results, however, were
no panacea promising good government. Problems still existed.
Both city and county governments were expensive and inefficient.
They duplicated some services and failed to provide others in the
metropolitan area. But the consolidation effort was not the only
game in town. During the 1960s, Jacksonvillians were involved in
multiple efforts toward improving the city’s economy, downtown,
cultural life, race relations, schools, and politics.

43. Ibid., 99-100; Florida Times-Union, June 21, 1967.
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